Cooperator subjectively transforms the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game into the assurance game: Empirical evidence from an eye-tracking study

Kaede MAEEDA, Associate professor, Rikkyo University, Japan

According to the group heuristic model, we hypothesized that cooperation in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game toward in-group members should be based on fast (rather than slow) decision making. Furthermore, we utilized an eye-tracking measure and examined whether the cooperator subjectively transformed the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game into the assurance game. Our findings suggested that 1) the decision-making time was faster for those who cooperated with in-group members than those who did not cooperate. In addition, 2) cooperators, regardless of whom they were cooperating with, generally tended to pay more attention to the payoff that both players cooperate with each other and also their partners’ payoff than the non-cooperators. These results suggest the operation of social exchange heuristics and support the group heuristic model.